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Abstract. Prices and characteristics were collected for two similar, adjacent buildings.
One building, a co-op, has a master mortgage with a prepayment lock-out, while the
other building, a condo, has no master mortgage. They provide a natural experiment to
isolate the capitalization of ﬁnancing terms. The research provides the clearest
demonstration to date of the impact of ﬁnancing terms on sales price. The value of the
prepayment lock-out is estimated, using a stochastic simulation, as a function of the level
of interest rates, rate volatility and time remaining on the lock-out provision. Prices for
co-op units are found to ﬂuctuate with the value of the prepayment lock-out. The value
of the lock-out is overcapitalized in the price of co-op units. Co-op status reduces the
value of apartments by about 9%.
Introduction
In 1967 a complex of three buildings, in the same architectural style, was built in
northwest Washington DC. In 1980–81 two of the buildings were converted from
rental property to owner-occupancy. One became a co-op, the other a condo. The co-
op obtained a 30-year master mortgage, at a then attractive 10% interest rate, with a
15-year prepayment lock-out, followed by a declining prepayment penalty. The condo
had no master mortgage.
Since purchasing a unit in the co-op requires assuming a share of the master
mortgage’s payments, economically rational, fully informed buyers and sellers will
capitalize the value of any unusual ﬁnancing provisions in the sale price of the units.
Previous researchers, examining below-market rate mortgage terms, calculated the
value of the ﬁnancing under the assumption that interest rates were not stochastic.
This line of research usually found incomplete capitalization–sales prices were
increased by the ﬁnancing, but by less than 100% of the ﬁnancing’s value. This article
suggests an alternative method for calculating the value of unusual ﬁnancing
arrangements attached to the purchase of owner-occupied housing. A dynamic
stochastic simulation of the time path of interest rates is used to calculate an expected
value of the difference in payment streams between the co-op’s mortgage and a
standard condo mortgage. This estimated value is then used in a hedonic regression
to predict the selling price of units in the co-op. By adding data from the adjacent,
virtually identical condo building, a sharper estimate of the value of the ﬁnancing
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terms can be obtained, as well as an estimate of the effect of co-op status vs. condo
status.
The remainder of the article is laid out as follows. The ﬁrst section reviews the
literature on pricing mortgage features. This is followed by a discussion of the model
used to value the terms of the co-op’s mortgage. Then the hedonic model used to test
for capitalization effects is presented. The next section discusses the characteristics
of the two VanNess buildings and describes the multiple listing service data used to
test the market’s value of the blanket mortgage. Finally, an empirical section tests the
market’s pricing of the co-op’s ﬁnancing.
Previous Research
A series of papers written in the mid–1980s, many collected in a 1984 special issue
of Housing Finance Review, found incomplete capitalization effects for below-market
assumable mortgages. Most researchers calculated the value of the below-market
ﬁnancing using the Cash Equivalence method, which assumes that the current
difference between the mortgage rate and the market rate will continue for the
remaining term of the mortgage. Smith, Sirmans and Sirmans (1984) and Strathman,
DeLacy and Dueker (1984) made some adjustments to the cash equivalence measure,
assuming that the below market mortgage would reﬁnance in ﬁve years, and include
an estimate of the tax consequences of the ﬁnancing.
Cash Equivalence (or some variant) is then included in a hedonic regression with
property characteristics, and the coefﬁcient on the value of the ﬁnancing terms is
interpreted as a measure of capitalization. By and large, these articles ﬁnd incomplete
capitalization; the value of the property increases by some percentage of the cash
equivalence value of the ﬁnancing, with ‘‘adjusted’’ values coming closer to 100%
capitalization. An interesting alternative method is that of Schwartz and Kapplin
(1984), who match sales of Florida condominiums with concessionary mortgage terms
to similar units with market rate mortgages, in place of using a hedonic regression to
standardize the sales prices. In some ways this method yields a more precise estimate
of capitalization than does the approach presented here, as the functional form of the
hedonic regression is no longer an issue. However, their method breaks down if there
is any unobserved systematic difference between units offered with and without
concessionary ﬁnancing.
Options models of mortgage prepayment suggest an alternative to Cash Equivalence
for calculating the value of the ﬁnancing in the face of volatile interest rates. The
contractual provisions in the co-op’s mortgage, which preclude reﬁnancing for ﬁfteen
years (a prepayment lock-out), and assess a prepayment penalty afterwards, can be
thought of as an option whose value is driven by a stochastic variable, the current
rate of interest. Given the complexity of the declining prepayment penalty in the
contract, a simulation strategy can be employed to ‘‘price the option.’’ Similar
techniques have been used by Berry and Gehr (1985), Hall (1985) and Leung and
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Mortgage Valuation
The master mortgage that was signed in April 1980, when the VanNess North was
converted to a co-op, carries a ﬁxed interest rate of 10%, and a 30-year amortization
schedule. There is a prepayment lock-out for ﬁfteen years. In April 1995, the mortgage
could be prepaid with a 5% penalty. The penalty declines by one percentage point
annually until April 2000 when the mortgage can be prepaid without penalty. At the
time of conversion, new purchasers could chose their LTV, up to 90%. Most buyers
chose the maximum, but some did not. By 1994, amortization and property
appreciation had lowered the master mortgage obligation to about 45% of value for
units whose ﬁrst purchaser chose the maximum mortgage balance. However, a few
units that had been encumbered with little or no mortgage obligation at the time of
conversion had much smaller master mortgage obligations, and two units sold with
no master mortgage balance at all.
A simple method was needed to value this rather complex option. The valuation was
done with a spreadsheet simulation. Quarterly mortgage interest rates from 1984–94
were obtained in order to measure volatility. Volatility was deﬁned as the root mean
square of the ﬁrst differences of the log of the quarterly rates for the previous ﬁve
years. Interest rates had a pronounced downward drift for most of this period; this
speciﬁcation assumes that the true process is a driftless random walk.1 The measured
volatility, s, ranged from 0.04 to 0.13.
2 s5SQUARE ROOT(o(ln(r)2ln(r)) / n). (1) tt 21
A spreadsheet model was built that started with the log of the mortgage rate prevailing
in the quarter of purchase. The next quarter added to the log of the previous quarter’s
rate a draw from a normal distribution with mean 0, and s as calculated in Equation
(1) with data from the preceding twenty quarters.
r 5exp(ln(r)1N(0, s)). (2) t11 t
If the prevailing mortgage rate was sufﬁciently below the contract rate on the co-op
mortgage, and the prepayment lock-out had expired, the prevailing mortgage rate for
the quarter was assigned (a reﬁnancing) and the reﬁnancing costs (including
prepayment penalties, if any) were included in the balance. Otherwise, the contract
rate was kept. A series of candidate decision rules for the threshold reﬁnancing
difference was tested, and the series of decision rules that minimized the expected
present value of the after-tax cash ﬂows was chosen. This was done for each quarter
remaining in the mortgage’s term. The after-tax present value of each stream was
calculated, assuming a marginal tax rate of 34.9% (the combination of 28% federal
and 9.5% DC.). This process was repeated 1000 times and the value of the mortgage
was taken to be the mean of the present values of the streams of after-tax mortgage
interest payments.
The same procedure was followed to value a condo mortgage. In order to model the
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necessary to assume a counterfactual ﬁnancing method. The model assumes that the
alternative for a co-op buyer was a condo purchased with a standard, 30-year ﬁxed-
rate mortgage, non-assumable, with a 6% termination probability in each year, which
reﬂects the annual rate of sales in the two buildings. If the mortgage terminated, the
buyer obtained a new mortgage at the new prevailing rate. If rates in a future year
were low enough, relative to the condo buyers’ mortgage rate, the mortgage was
assumed to reﬁnance at the new rate with the payment of two points.
Second, the noninterest terms of the mortgage that the co-op would get if it reﬁnanced
had to be speciﬁed. The model assumes that the co-op will reﬁnance into a ﬁxed-rate
mortgage, with a 10-year lock-out, for the remaining term of the mortgage. The
Freddie Mac 30-year ﬁxed-rate commitment rate was used. When/if the mortgage
reﬁnances, it will probably be into a 15-year commercial mortgage. Ten-year
commercial mortgages have averaged ﬁfty basis points above 30-year single-family
mortgages during the early 1990s (Nothaft, 1994), but the class of commercial
mortgages includes industrial properties, new rental projects with 70% LTVs, etc., all
of which would have substantially higher default premia than would a 45% LTV co-
op mortgage. In 1994/1995, 10-year lock-outs were typical for 15-year co-op
mortgages, and contract rates were about the same as those on 30-year ﬁxed-rate
single-family mortgages.
The key explanatory variable in the hedonic regressions that follow is the difference
between the value of the co-op master mortgage payments and the value of a condo
mortgage’s payments. The primary determinants of the net value of the co-op
mortgage are, of course, the spread between the current mortgage rate and the co-
op’s 10% rate, and the length of time remaining on the prepayment lock-out or the
level of the prepayment penalty.
A Model of Unit Pricing
In order to test for capitalization effects, a hedonic model was estimated to predict
the sale price of units in the co-op and condo. The dependent variable is sales price
per square foot, measured in nominal dollars. Independent variables are entered in
levels. The choice of functional form was dictated by the fact that most hedonic studies
(for instance, Blomquist and Worley, 1981) ﬁnd that a log transformation ﬁts best,
but some of the independent variables in this study are clearly not multiplicative. A
parking space, for instance, cannot have a proportionate effect on price, or arbitrage
would result in all parking spaces being sold to the most expensive units. Coulson
(1989) ﬁnds that ‘‘those markets in which the attribute is divisible and recombinable
are more arbitrageable and hence more linear than those attributes which are not.’’ By
focusing on price per square foot and appropriately transforming some independent
variables, characteristics such as quality of view or number of bedrooms can have a
roughly proportionate effect on price (as a log transform provides) while others, such
as a parking space or mortgage value, have an additive effect.
The following variables are assumed to inﬂuence price per square foot of a condo or
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to vary with unit size. Two dummy variables, EFFICIENCY and 1-BEDROOM, also
allow variability by size, allowing efﬁciencies and one-bedrooms to have different
prices. The omitted category is two or more bedrooms. Number of baths is not used
as all one-bedrooms had one bath; all two-bedrooms had two baths. Another variable,
PARKVIEW, equaled one if the unit had a view of Rock Creek Park. FLOOR2 is an
integer variable measuring number of ﬂoors above ground. Seasonality is captured
with a dummy variable, SUMMER, which equals one for contracts signed from April
to September. Annual time splines are entered to capture general trends in the housing
market.
The variable CO-OP equals one for the VN North and zero for the VN East to absorb
any inherent differences in the buildings beyond the effects of the blanket mortgage
valuation, such as co-op vs. condo status. A negative price differential can be expected
for co-ops based on DC’s favorable tax treatment of co-op conversions. Rental housing
converted to condominium status pays a 4.7% condo conversion fee, a 1.1% real estate
transfer tax and a 1.1% mortgage recordation fee,3 but conversions to co-op status are
exempt. A developer converting a rental building to owner-occupancy is presumably
indifferent between co-op conversions and condo conversions, at the same after-tax
price, so the relative supply of co-ops to condos should be inﬁnitely elastic at a price
difference of about 6.9%. On the demand side, the relatively unfavorable terms for
secondary ﬁnancing of the ‘gap’ between the blanket mortgage and unit value would
reduce willingness to pay for this co-op by 1%–3%.4 Additionally, the need to accept
the master mortgage’s ﬁxed-rate payment on a 15- to 20-year amortization (depending
on year of purchase), and the more restrictive rules imposed by the co-op board,
would reduce demand further, relative to condo status. This would also result in co-
ops and condos being treated as imperfect substitutes on the demand side, as
preferences for rules and mortgage terms would vary among potential demanders.
Other variables should have an additive effect on the price of the unit, instead of
inﬂuencing price per foot. There are resale markets for parking spaces, and an active
rental market in which occupants of one building sometimes rent spaces in the other
building. Thus, the variable PARKING is the number of parking spaces (usually one),
divided by the square footage of the unit. In this way, the coefﬁcient on PARKING
measures the price of a parking space. The net relative value of the portion of the co-
op mortgage assigned to each co-op unit, divided by square feet, is the key
independent variable. The present value of the expected difference in mortgage
payments should act as a lump-sum tax, so that a $1 increase in net expected value
of co-op mortgage payments (holding condo payments ﬁxed) should translate into a
$1 decrease in unit value. The coefﬁcient on this variable measures the capitalization
of the mortgage terms into the price of the co-op unit. A coefﬁcient of one would
imply that unit prices change dollar-for-dollar with changes in the value of the co-op
mortgage.
$/FEET5a1b FEET1b FLOOR1b (PARKING/FEET)1b PARKVIEW 12 3 4
1b EFFIC1b 1BR1b (NETVAL/FEET)1b CO-OP1b SUMMER 56 7 8 9
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$/SQ FT 117 121 119
SQUARE FEET 1218 792 1001
FLOOR 7.6 5.5 6.5
PARKINGa (000’s) 0.86 0.86 0.86
PARKVIEW 0.43 0.68 0.56
EFFICIENCY 0.05 0.23 0.15
1-BEDROOM 0.43 0.62 0.53
SUMMER 0.51 0.51 0.51
CO-OP 1 0 0.49
NETVALa 22.55 0 21.25
CASHEQa 21.15 0 0.56
aThese variables were calculated using square feet. For instance, a
1,200 sq. ft. unit that sold with one parking space had a PARKING
value of (1000/1,200). A net value of 2$10,000 for a 1,200 sq. ft. unit
had a NETVAL of (210,000/1,200).
Data
The primary data source is Washington DC’s Multiple Listing Service (MLS).5 List
price, sales price, fees, contract date, square footage, number of bedrooms, whether
zero, one or two parking spaces were sold with the unit, dollar value of the master
mortgage allocated to a co-op unit, and unit number were taken from the MLS sheets
for units sold from January, 1989 to July, 1995. Sales with contract dates between
January, 1989 and March, 1995 were kept. Sales that were clearly identiﬁed as
foreclosure were eliminated. This provided 310 sales, 152 observations in the co-op
and 158 in the condo. The MLS data were supplemented with interest rates from
Freddie Mac.
Both buildings were designed by the same architect in the same style, with the same
fac ¸ade.6 The co-op (VN North) is the taller of the buildings at sixteen stories, the
condo (VN East) building is twelve stories high. VN North is split almost equally
between one- and two-bedroom units, with a handful of efﬁciencies and three-
bedrooms, while almost two-thirds of the VN East’s units are one-bedrooms. Holding
number of bedrooms constant, units in the co-op are slightly larger than units in the
condo (see Exhibit 1). The co-op has more restrictive rules than the condo, particularly
with regard to owners leasing-out units. Most importantly, the co-op has a master
mortgage whose payments a new purchaser must assume.
Prices were kept in nominal dollars, as prices in the VN East, and average selling
price (not quality adjusted) for condos in northwest Washington actually fell slightly
over the six-year period. Price per square foot rose slightly in VN East and fell slightly
in the VN North from the end of 1988 until mid-1992. Prices fell in both buildings
from mid-1992 until late 1993, at which point VN East started to rise in price (ExhibitsCAPITALIZATION OF ABOVE MARKET FINANCING 169
Exhibit 2
CO-OP Building
($’s Adjusted for # Bedrooms and Parking)
2 and 3). VN North continued to fall into 1994, ﬁnally rising in late 1994. Washington
experienced a real estate downturn during 1992–94.
The net value of assuming the co-op’s mortgage fell dramatically over the period
studied. From 1989 to 1991, the value is near zero as the prevailing mortgage rate is
about 10%. The value is not precisely zero even when the prevailing rate is 10%,
because a single-family mortgage at 10% has a prepayment option that the co-op
lacks. The value of the option falls continuously through the third quarter of 1993 as
interest rates fall (Exhibit 4). In the last quarter of 1993 the value turns slightly upward
as the time to lock-out expiration decreases. Late in 1994, the value turns sharply
upward as interest rates rise. The quality-adjusted difference in price between the two
buildings generally tracks the change in mortgage value (Exhibit 5).
An after-tax Cash Equivalence value of the difference in mortgage terms was also
calculated, assuming no volatility in interest rates. If the prevailing rate was low
enough that the present value of reﬁnancing was positive, the co-op mortgage was
assumed to reﬁnance, paying a 5% penalty, at the expiration of the lock-out. Under
this speciﬁcation, the co-op mortgage looked very attractive in 1989–90, since the
co-op rate was very slightly below the prevailing rate and the co-op mortgage could
be assumed without paying points. The Cash Equivalence approach ignores the
substantial value of the prepayment option attached to the standard condo mortgage.170 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 3
Condo Building
($’s Adjusted for # Bedrooms and Parking)
Cash Equivalence also departs from the stochastic simulation estimate in the 1993–
94 period, because Cash Equivalence ignores the risk that rates would rise before the
expiration of the lock-out, preventing the co-op from locking in the low rates
prevailing in 1993 (this actually occurred in 1994).
Regression Results
The value of the co-op mortgage is highly collinear with the fall in neighborhood
prices that occurred in 1992–93. However, the use of data from both buildings allows
the separation of the mortgage effect from the general trend in prices. Regressions
were run by stacking data from both buildings, with a dummy variable, CO-OP,
absorbing any inherent differences in price between the two buildings. White’s (1980)
test for heteroskedasticity was applied to each speciﬁcation. The null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity was not rejected at 10% for any speciﬁcation estimated.
Additionally, there was no evidence for autocorrelation in the residuals. Thus, simple
ordinary least squares is the appropriate estimation method.
The primary speciﬁcation ﬁt remarkably well (see Exhibit 6). The EFFICIENCY, 1-
BEDROOM and SQUARE FEET variables all indicated that price per square foot risesCAPITALIZATION OF ABOVE MARKET FINANCING 171
Exhibit 4
Relative Mortgage Value
with size. This is consistent with the opinion of realtors in the area, and with Stigler’s
survivor principle (Stigler, 1958), as a few small units have been combined over time,
but no large units have been split. PARKVIEW and FLOOR are both positive,
consistent with previous work by Pollard (1977) and Blomquist (1988) indicating the
value of a good view as an amenity. The effect of increasing height by one ﬂoor is
only a 0.6% increase in price. When shares were originally allocated at the time of
the co-op’s conversion, the number of shares increased by 1% per ﬂoor. PARKING
adds almost $8,000 to the price of a unit. That agrees with the handful of parking
spaces that sold over the time period for prices between $5,000 and $11,000.
The coefﬁcient of 1.88 on NETVAL in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation provides evidence for
overcapitalization of the above-market terms of the co-op mortgage. Each $1.00 drop
in the value of assuming the co-op’s blanket mortgage produces a $1.88 decline in
the selling price of a co-op unit. This is in contrast to the conclusions of studies of
below-market ﬁnancing where incomplete capitalization is usually found. In the
second speciﬁcation, which uses Cash Equivalence in place of the stochastic
simulation, the coefﬁcient is 2.18, even farther from 100% capitalization, and the
standard error of the coefﬁcient is larger (although the R2s are identical). In the third
speciﬁcation, which does not include any measure of ﬁnancing differences, the R2 and
adjusted R2 are lower.172 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 5
Price Difference
(Adjusted for Unit Characteristics)
Before offering explanations of overcapitalization, it is important to note that the
capitalization coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly greater than zero, but only one standard
deviation above one. The null hypothesis of 100% capitalization is not rejected, but
the magnitude of the coefﬁcient is large enough to warrant a discussion of possible
explanations.
There are several plausible explanations for the measured overcapitalization. The ﬁrst
is simple, the ‘marginal transactors’ in the co-op may have had marginal tax rates
lower than that assumed in the model. The median selling price in the co-op is
$138,000, slightly higher than the $124,000 median price of owner-occupied housing
in DC in 1990 (Census). If the median income of owners is slightly higher than the
$49,000 for DC owner-occupants (Census), the median owner would be at the high
side of the 28% bracket for single-ﬁlers and the low side of 28% for married-ﬁlers.
But, the building has several occupants and a few potential buyers who may be in
lower tax brackets, either because they are foreign nationals working for the World
Bank, etc., or because they are retirees living on assets. If they represented marginal
buyers in some time periods, the after-tax mortgage differences may overstate the net
difference in mortgage terms.8CAPITALIZATION OF ABOVE MARKET FINANCING 173
Exhibit 6
Regression Coefﬁcients
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Variable BETA t-Stat BETA t-Stat BETA t-Stat
INTERCEPT 114.83 112.75 115.55
SQUARE FEET 0.01 2.3 0.01 2.4 0.01 2.3
FLOOR 0.81 3.8 0.81 3.8 0.85 3.9
PARKING 7.91 5.8 7.93 5.9 8.01 5.9
PARKVIEW 0.70 0.4 0.51 0.3 0.61 0.4
EFFICIENCY 221.18 25.0 220.91 24.9 221.27 24.9
1-BEDROOM 214.60 25.2 214.39 25.1 214.95 25.3
SUMMER 1.73 1.2 2.17 1.5 1.89 1.3
Y1989 0.35 1.0 0.53 1.4 0.37 1.0
Y1990 20.30 21.0 20.35 21.2 20.22 20.8
Y1991 0.07 0.2 0.17 0.5 20.10 20.3
Y1992 20.54 21.5 20.63 21.7 20.66 21.8
Y1993 20.29 20.8 20.37 21.0 20.42 21.2
Y1994 20.23 20.7 20.19 20.6 20.09 20.3
CO-OP 210.53 23.9 213.21 26.2 215.43 27.8
NETVAL 1.88 2.7
CASHEQ 2.18 2.7
R2 .554 .554 .530
Adjusted R2 .531 .531 .521
df 294 294 295
The second explanation is that overcapitalization reﬂects risk aversion. The purchase
of a housing bundle that includes above (or below) market ﬁnancing is, essentially,
the purchase of an interest rate derivative. The value of the ﬁnancing element of the
housing bundle may be much more volatile than other components. This is especially
true if, as seems likely, mortgage interest rates are more volatile than house prices.
Additionally, typical homebuyers may have little familiarity with the pricing of
complex ﬁnancial instruments, leading them to attach substantial uncertainty to their
estimates of the value of unusual ﬁnancing terms. Under these circumstances, risk-
averse homebuyers would offer less than the expected value for favorable, but risky,
ﬁnancing and would accept unfavorable, risky ﬁnancing only if offered a price
reduction in excess of its expected value. The combination of risk-averse buyers and
the uncertain value of ﬁnancing terms could explain both the undercapitalization of
favorable ﬁnancing and the overcapitalization of unfavorable ﬁnancing.
The estimate of the coefﬁcient on the CO-OP variable implies an estimated 9%
difference between condo and co-op prices (a $10.53 discount on a $119 mean price
per square foot). This is not signiﬁcantly different from the 6.9% discount expected
based on DC’s favorable tax treatment for co-op conversions. Goodman and Goodman
(1995) ﬁnd a 7%–30% discount for co-ops in their nationwide sample, depending on
the bundle of characteristics priced, with a 12% discount implied by their preferred
speciﬁcation. However, Goodman and Goodman do not include ﬁnancing terms in
their regressions, so their estimate represents the sum of the value of ﬁnancing and174 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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any inherent difference caused by co-op status. The effect of mortgage terms may
have been negative and substantial, as the year they chose for their estimation, 1987,
was a ten year low for mortgage rates. Many of the co-ops in their sample may have
had above-market contract mortgage rates. In the third speciﬁcation reported in Exhibit
6, in which ﬁnancing terms are excluded from the regression, co-op status is estimated
to reduce apartment values by 13%, close to the value found by Goodman and
Goodman.
Conclusion
The regressions indicate that co-op units are worth about 9% less than comparable
condo units, when the attached ﬁnancing is equivalent to that available in the condo
market. It is interesting to note that the board of this co-op considered conversion to
condo status until a hired consultant estimated conversion costs at 10% or more of
building value, and at least two co-ops in the Virginia suburbs are in the process of
converting to condo status. However, to date no co-op in the District of Columbia has
ever converted to condo status (Richards, 1994).
Unlike previous research, which indicates incomplete capitalization of unusual
ﬁnancing terms, this article ﬁnds more than 100% capitalization of the terms of the
co-op mortgage. Risk aversion is consistent with both under-capitalization of below-
market terms and over-capitalization of above-market terms. Low tax rates for
marginal buyers could also contribute to this result.
The research does indicate that co-op prices are determined by the value of the
underlying ﬁnancing. A straightforward stochastic estimate of the value of
complicated ﬁnancing terms is shown to be systematically related to co-op prices.
Notes
1Figlewski (1994) ﬁnds that the best prediction of future volatility is given by historical volatility
measured over a long time period (ﬁve to ten years) and assumes a mean ﬁrst difference of
zero.
2The buildings are built into the slope of a hill. The ground ﬂoor may be the ﬁrst through the
sixth. It was necessary to consult a ﬂoor plan to turn the unit number into FLOOR.
3The legal status of mortgage recordation fees for these co-ops is unclear.
4Secondary ﬁnancing on individual co-op units, called ‘share loans,’ is usually available at
twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty basis points above the prevailing mortgage rate. An after-tax present value
on 100% share loan ﬁnancing discounted at a 5% after-tax discount rate would imply a 3%–
7% disadvantage for co-ops. As this co-op has a master mortgage averaging 45%, share loan
ﬁnancing would be needed for less than half the unit value.
5Missing or questionable data were provided by building managers.
6The construction and history of the VanNess complex is described in Goode (1988).
7Another speciﬁcation was tried in which the dependent variable was the Box-Cox transform
of price per square foot. Estimating l with a grid search between 0 and 1 yielded a maximum
R2 of l51. Expanding the grid search led to an R
2 maximizing l51.7. However, the
improvement in R2 over the speciﬁcation reported in the text was only .03. As the improvement
in ﬁt is modest, and the coefﬁcient on the variable of interest has a clear interpretation when
the dependent variable is not transformed, the Box-Cox results are not used.CAPITALIZATION OF ABOVE MARKET FINANCING 175
8A speciﬁcation that uses the before-tax mortgage differences in place of the after-tax mortgage
differences yields a capitalization coefﬁcient of 1.48 in place of the reported 1.88. As few buyers
would be in a zero tax bracket, this places an upper bound on the extent to which
overcapitalization may be driven by low marginal tax rates.
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